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Internationalised criminal trial and access to justice
MARK FINDLAY*
Universit of Sydnev, Facult of Law prior to University of Sydney, New South Wales 2000,
Australia
Introduction'
The influence of a human rights paradigm over the recent development of
local and regional criminal justice concerns throughout Europe is indisput-
able. Essential to this is the commitment that crucial lay parties within the
justice process (such as the accused and the victims) should have adequate
access to common procedural protections of criminal justice. This paper takes
this trend and measures its influence on the development of international
criminal justice, the trial in particular. At the very least we argue that parallel
concerns about fair trial in the international procedural context will endorse
the importance of a fair trial paradigm down to domestic trial levels. As part of
this analysis, the essential connection between access to justice and fairness,
in the context of international criminal trials,2 is critiqued.
The recent internationalisation of criminal procedure3 is a revealing con-
text within which to view the relationship between access to justice and
* Professor, Institute of Criminology, University of Sydney & Centre for Legal Research,
Nottingham Law School.
1 In conceptualising access to justice in this paper I do not intend to be restricted to the
consideration of the accused's participation in the trial. Access is more creatively viewed as
opportunities for participation in the trial which usually tend to favour professional players.
Justice in an adversarial context then needs to be ensured by opening up corresponding access
opportunities to lay participants in general, and the accused and the victim in particular. If
justice is seen to precede and post-date the trial then access concerns should prevail in these
situations as well.
2 When talking of international criminal trials the distinction should be remembered
between domestic trials which are internationalised (perhaps through the appeal process,
or through the contention of issues which cut across international law and relations), and
those trials which commence before the international tribunals. This distinction is implicit
throughout the paper if not always consciously drawn.
3 See L. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in co-
dification and implementation, 1997; also, P. Reichel, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems:
A topical approach, 1999.
Published in International Criminal Law Review, 2002, Vol. 2 (3), pp. 237-259.
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aspirations for fair trial.4 In this respect the comparative procedural dimen-
sion of the paper suggests that fair trial means different things in different
trial traditions. Where these traditions are at least accommodated in regional
and international tribunals, then the process of moving local to global may be
expected to require a harmonisation of fair trial and its influences. The paper
highlights, with the consideration of access to justice in particular, how this
may be problematic.
Many of the essential identifiers of access to justice are present in the
instruments establishing international criminal tribunals, 5 and are claimed as
their protections for fair trial. In this paper the potentially problematic nature
of access to justice within regional and internationalised criminal trials is
used to speculate on future developments in fair trial practice. 6 Fair trial in
turn is anticipated as becoming more relevant in the evaluation of common
law criminal justice, and the place of access issues within it.
An assumption underlying the arguments to follow is that international
trial procedures have the potential to influence the development of fair trial
practice within local jurisdictions. The recent impact of international law
(and its institutional conventions) on areas of the criminal law and practice
such as extradition and anti-terrorism might support this suggestion. 7 Any
potential for such influence is particularly compelling in the British courts
where, after the Human Rights Act 1998, the requirements for fair trial will
provide a crucial, holistic measure of acceptable trial practice. 8 Therefore it
will become increasingly significant for UK judges to draw on European jur-
isprudence when constructing a fair trial paradigm. The next question is, will
international criminal jurisprudence on fair trial, particularly where access to
justice is concerned, grow to provide another important level of authority?
4 This paper is not concerned with the wider debate about procedural synthesis and dif-
ference within internationalised criminal justice. For this see M. Findlay, Synthesis in Trial
Procedures? The experience of the international criminal tribunals, 50/1 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 2001, pp. 26-53.
5 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
6 In light of the essential connection between access to justice and fair trial (recognised in
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,
and now jurisdictionally through the Human Rights Act (Eng) 1988), the place of access to
justice within fair trial paradigms will become progressively more significant for common law
courts.
7 For a discussion of this, see P. A rnell, The Proper Law of the Crime in International Law
Revisited, 9/1 Nottingham Law Journal, 2000, pp. 39-52.
8 For an expansion of these themes, see M. Findlay, The Cost of Globalised Crime: New
levels of control, International Journal of Comparative Criminology, 2002 (forthcoming).
Also, see A. Ashworth, Article 6 and the Fairness of Trials, Crim. L.R., 1999, pp. 261-272.
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In civil law criminal procedure traditions such as France, European hu-
man rights jurisprudence (clearly comparable with that prevailing in over
international criminal trial practice) is critically impacting on criminal justice
process and its reform.9 In Belgium and in Italy human rights concerns, and
the challenge of practice in other procedural traditions, have brought about
radical changes in domestic criminal justice practice. 10 More recently in Italy,
there has arisen a backlash against rights-based procedural reform evidenced
by legislative attempts to restrict the impact of regional and international
conventions.
Even in common law jurisdictions, not governed by a domestic rights
charter or regional rights conventions, the recognition by the courts of the
influence of international human rights instruments and obligations11 has
generated the potential to see a greater adherence to "fair trial" paradigms (as
in international criminal trial procedure). Whether developments in access to
justice before the international criminal tribunals is an additional stimulus for
change, is worthy of contemplation. '
2
We conclude with a brief comment on evaluating access to justice in trial
practice. The critical understanding of the lay/professional relationship (par-
ticularly in terms of legal representation) is crucial the before reality of access
and its confirmation of fair trial. The international tribunals present a telhng
context wherein professional legal representation alone may not be enough
to demonstrate access to justice, or to ensure equality of arms and hence fair
trial. It will require to test these outcomes through a consideration of the
quality and compatibility of that representation.
9 For instance, at the pre-trial phase in inquisitorial processes it might be the secrecy sur-
rounding the crucial involvement in the dossier by the police, and the absence of accountable,
procedural controls over the police investigator which ham-strings defence counsel at trial,
and precludes fairness. Prosecutorial or judicial responsibility over the creation of the dossier,
the courts have held, may not cure this. For a discussion of recent developments in this system,
see J. Bell, "The French Pre-Trial System" in C. Walker & K. Starmer (eds.) Miscarriages of
Justice: A review of justice in error, 1999, chap 17.
10 S. Freccero, 'An Introduction to the New Criminal Procedure', 21 American Journal of
Criminal Law, 1994, pp. 345-383.
11 See, for instance, the High Court's comments in respect of indigenous land title, in Mabo
v State of Queensland (1992) 66 ALJR 408.
12 Some might say unfortunately, as a result of September 11 and the 'war on terror', the
more rapid distancing of the United States from the potential of an International Criminal
Court will make more problematic any comprehensive influence of international criminal
justice over global fair trial discourse.
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Internationalised criminal trial
After outset and clarity it is necessary to touch on the internationalisation
of criminal trial practice. More than simply considerations of procedure and
practice, the social and political context within which internationalisation is
occurring should be recalled, particularly when considering the significance
of access issues for internationalised trials.
Beyond the creation of international tribunals1 3 to investigate and try
crimes of world significance, there is emerging an international jurispru-
dence on criminal law, and procedural hybrids to support and develop
international criminal law. The principles on which this trend is based,
are informed by international human rights conventions 14 and multinational
political priorities.
It is not only trials (and trial procedure) before the international tribunals
which represents internationalisation in the present context. It could be argued
that the internationalisation of domestic trials, through a variety of processes
is as significant and may have preceded the rejuvenation of the international
tribunals. 1 5 For the purposes of this paper, and the argument about authority
and influence, we are more interested in the institutional development of
international trial practice rather than the transition of domestic trials into
international concerns.
The pace and form of recent developments in institutionalised interna-
tional criminal trials seems to be largely the product of global political
imperatives.1 6 The nature of these imperatives 17 has necessitated the oper-
13 Exemplified by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (in The
Hague), and moves towards an international criminal court see, "A Permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court" at www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/ICC.htm. Also W. Schabas, An
Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2001.
14 See L Dennis, Human Rights and Evidence in Adversarial Criminal Procedure: the ad-
vancement of international standards, in J. Nijboer & Reijntjes (eds.), Proceedings of the First
World Conference on New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence, 1997, pp. 523-532.
15 For a discussion of the domestic source of certain international criminal trials beyond the
international tribunal structure see G.K. McDonald & 0. Swaak Goldman (eds.), Substantive
and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: the experience of international and
national courts, 2000, and D. Woodhouse (ed.), The Pinochet Case: a legal and constitutional
analysis, 2000.
16 Such as the need to try war criminals identified as a consequence of more regular global
military interventions such as Bosnia and Serbia. See D. Coti, A Critical Study of the Inter-
national Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 5/2-3 Criminal Law Forum, 1994, pp. 223 236.
Also note the recent US opposition to the establishment of an International Criminal Court is
founded on the American view of an inextricable connection between any such court and the
mandate and interests of the UN Security Council.
17 Driven as they are by the foreign policy concerns of the United States and Western
Europe, even more than those of world agencies such as the United Nations. See R. Goldstone,
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ation of trials and resultant penal sanctions within two broad and divergent
criminal justice traditions, and their derivations. 18 The speed with which
these developments have occurred, has meant that the evolution of inter-
national criminal institutions and procedures appears expedient rather than
experimental, rationalised rather than rational. 19
When analysing these trends, the context of the criminal trial reveals the
contemporary parallels between intemationalised justice and international
political mission. Because of its essential connection with the negotiation and
imposition of penal sanctions, the trial of war crimes in particular demon-
strates a primary political imperative for the internationalisation process.
20
For instance, the global political push to an international criminal law, and
its institutions, 21 recently has relied on the connection between the image
of a "just" international military intervention, 22 and the necessity to punish
"crimes" which either justified that intervention or were perpetrated by those
opposed to it. At the conclusion of the military context, the resolution of
Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: truth commissions and intemational criminal tribunals,
28/3 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 1996, pp. 485-503.
18 For a discussion of the place of civil and common law procedures within recent war
crimes trials, see T McCormack & J. Simpson, The Law of War Crimes: National and
international approaches, 1997.
19 It is also important to recognise that the structure of these international institutions
and the derivation of the procedures under which they will operate have been the subject
of intense political lobbying. See M. Schaif, The Politics Behind the U.S. Opposition to
the International Criminal Court, New England International and Comparative Law Annual,
<www.nesl.edu/annual/volS/sclrarf.htin> 1998. Also the resistance to this trend takes on an
expedient and politicised format particularly after September 11.
20 See T Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 1999.
21 Opposition to such developments rests on the preference by countries like the US and
China to use their UN Security Council veto to negotiate and control prosecutions, rather
than as a general resistance to the concept. While the Americans endorse the court concept
they seem unwilling to relinquish their dominance of international institutions through an
independent prosecution process, and have put the view that the proposal for an interna-
tional criminal court will fail without their support. In the US view the connection between
political priorities and the rule of law is clear at an international level. Now as the masters
of the international coalition against terror the US have taken over the institutional role of
police and courts in a military context following the fall of the Taliban. See D. Schaffer,
Address Before the Southern Californian Working Group on the International Criminal Court,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzig/genocide/iccus.html 1998.
22 This concept of a "just" war not only regularly appeared in the rhetoric of NATO over
Kosovo, but has since been implicit in delineating the "crimes" of the Serbians from the
necessities of NATO forces - see also, G. Ulmen, Just Wars or Just Enemies, in 109 Telos,
1996,pp.99-112.
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these "crimes" is transferred into the courtroom and the trial.23 Further, the
trial seems to be a less contentious domain where the two principal Western
procedural styles of justice confront one another.24 The same could not be
said, for instance, of the pre-trial phase.
25
A sometimes overstated characteristic of internationalised criminal trials
is the prevalence of procedural features from both civil and common-law pro-
cedural styles. A harmony of convenience is emerging through international
trial practice, rather than as yet any recognised institutional procedural syn-
thesis. 26 A brief recognition of the contest between these traditions, and their
foundation principles, may help to explain the concept of fair trial currently
prevailing internationally.
27
Underlying procedural traditions and the foundations of fair trial
As stated earlier, for the purposes of this paper it is not essential to the discus-
sion of access and internationalised criminal procedure that the relationship
between pre-existing procedural traditions be exhaustively discussed. In fact
useful comparative examinations of this relationship are scarce. 28 It is more
important that the positioning of these traditions is understood, in terms of
the foundations they provide for fair trial discourse and the manner in which
these are pragmatically dealt with by international Trial Chambers.
The intemationalisation of criminal justice has necessitated debates about
synthesising two traditions of criminal procedure (civil law and common law
in origin). 29 This, however, has not been a straightforward or bifurcated con-
sideration of different criminal justice traditions, particularly where American
23 See D. Robinson, Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs: Major developments in 1997 at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, XXXV Canadian Yearbook
of International Criminal Law, 1997, pp. 179 213.
24 See V Tochilovsky, Trial in International Criminal Jurisdictions: Battle or scrutiny, 6/1
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1998, pp. 55-59.
25 This is not to downplay the significant differences between civil law and common law
evidentiary rules and trial practice, the comparative analysis of which will form the basis of
much of the research to follow. See, for instance. D. Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 5/2-3 Criminal Law Forum, 1994, pp.
507-555.
26 See Findlay, supra note 4.
27 See M. Findlay, Fair Trial and the Rights Dimension of International Trial Procedure
(unpublished paper).
28 One such is . Hatchard, B. Huber & R. Vogler, Comparative Criminal Procedure, 1996.
29 See F King & A. La Rosa, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:
current Survey - the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994-1996, 8/1 European
Journal of International Law, 1997, pp. 123-179.
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commentators have been involved. Significant derivations within each main
procedural style30 (and the political systems they support) make the compar-
ative evaluation and exploration of actual and potential synthesis intricate.
3 1
Such analysis involves more than merely the unpacking of broad legal styles,
rather requiring comparative research within the realms of politics and policy,
at domestic and global levels. 32 In addition, the derivation of the international
tribunals may reveal as much about their procedural entity as any historical
analysis of legal traditions.
33
Fortunately, the consideration of civil law criminal procedure within the
common law criminal trial has now moved beyond policy concerns for im-
proved "service delivery" at any jurisdictional level alone. 34 The developing
importance of extradition, mutual assistance, and the intemationalisation of
criminal procedure in war crimes tribunals, means a recognition that modem
criminal justice must operate above jurisdictional peculiarities. 35 Proposals
for an International Criminal Court (ICC) enunciate the expectation that con-
tracting states will assist in the investigation and prosecution of crimes against
humanity, well beyond the narrow requirements of constitutional legality or
international law.
36
The trend towards a more common and transferable criminal procedure
is clearly needs driven in a globalised climate where crime and its control
are matters for international agencies. 37 Parallel with this has been genuine
endeavours in the main procedural traditions to unify and simplify their crim-
30 Such as between English and American common law, Italian and French civil law.
31 For a sophisticated examination ofthe relationship between these broad procedural styles,
see K. Zweigert & H. K&t-, Introduction to Comparative Law, 1998.
32 For an analysis of the inextricable association between methods of legal regulation, and
domestic and global political interests, see M. Findlay, The Globalisation of Crime, 1999,
chap. 1.
33 For instance, it might be argued that the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals are more the
creatures of American military justice models, than of common law or civil law courts -
see J. Cockayne, Procedural and Processual Synthesis in International Tribunals (unpublished
paper), 2001.
34 This has been an efficiency measure which in part motivated the recent civil procedure
reforms in the UK and Australian jurisdictions. It well demonstrates the problems inherent
in using concepts essentially relevant to the participant whose expectations may construct a
notion of "service" and its efficient delivery.
35 The identification of globalised crime and control agendas for issues such as the drug
trade, and interet fraud emphasises the need for the construction of laws and procedures
as free as possible from jurisdictional restriction or the impediments of convention. When
faced by crime without sites, the legal/procedural response should move beyond jurisdictional
identity. The difficulties in achieving this in a credible fashion are considerable.
36 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Part 9: International Cooperation and
Judicial Assistance.
37 For a discussion of crime and globalisation, see Findlay supra note 32.
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inal processes. This is manifest, with varying degrees of success, through
efforts at uniform criminal codes within many common law jurisdictions,
and the transfer of common code traditions across civil law jurisdictions,
particularly in transitional eastern European states. The logical extension of
such developments is the transferability of justice models via the harmon-
isation and rationalisation of criminal procedure within a rights paradigm,
to satisfy emerging international obligations and interests. 38 An immediate
recognition of (and perhaps stimulus for) greater procedural harmonisation in
the British context will arise as the courts explore continental and European
jurisprudence on fair trial, as a natural consequence of the Human Rights
Act governing the development of trial practice on a case-by-case basis. The
courts may need to look further and seek the assistance of "fair trial" jurispru-
dence even as it is developing within international procedural contexts. For
example, the status of the victim in the trial is generating an impetus for this.
Access to justice is a universal indicator of trial fairness and rights re-
cognition within the context of the European Convention. Lord Woolf (the
current English Chief Justice) in his influential report on access to justice in
the English civil jurisdictions39 identified the failings of that system as in-
cluding delay, expense, lack of proportionality, and differential accessibility.
The same could be alleged against many common law criminal justice juris-
dictions. The Woolf Report advocated, amongst other things, a comparative
inquiry into civil styles of justice in order to address the deficiencies in the
delivery of justice in common law traditions. Typical, however, of the debate
in a policy climate, the course of such synthesis was not detailed.
Even so, the recommendations of Woolf (touched upon in more detail later)
may provide a very general template for addressing the reality of access to
justice provisions in the international criminal trial institutions. For instance,
in relation to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) it is important to interrogate
the processes of appointing legal counsel, the resourcing of the accused's
defence, and in general the equality of arms between the parties. There is
little potency in assertions of access to justice which, as Woolf identifies, are
not backed up by such essential practice guarantees.
In civil law traditions, the concern over access as an indicator of trial
fairness is also apparent. For instance, the Codice di procedura (CCP) in Italy
which was in 1989 a fundamental revision of the preceding codes, emphas-
38 For a comprehensive analysis of the influence of rights paradigms over emerging inter-
national criminal procedure and its accommodations, see D. Amann, Harmonic Convergence?
Constitutional criminal procedure in an international context, 75/3 Indiana Law Journal 2000,
pp. 810 873.
39 H. Woolf, Access to Justice: the final report to the Lord Chancellor on the civil justice
system in England and Wales, 1996.
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ised the predominance of oral evidence in the trial. The intention was as much
as anything to ensure the position of the accused and his rights to test the case
against him to the fullest. The CCP also repositioned the status of professional
players in the trial while continuing to recognise the importance of access to
justice for civil claimants, such as victims. Access as an issue of balance
between rights and responsibilities in the trial was the tone here.
In the operations of the international tribunals there has been qualified
success in transplanting key aspects of civil law criminal procedure into
trial practice. Reasons of jurisdictional loyalty and familiarity are continu-
ally exposed through the preferred practice of judges and prosecutors in the
international criminal tribunals. Others have suggested that the manner in
which judicial authority is used in the tribunals tends to favour one procedural
tradition over the other.
40
It would appear that in terms of ideology and principle rather than proced-
ural detail, the synthesis of traditions at the international level has gathered
momentum. A concern is that common claims concerning access to justice as
a feature of this harmony may also remain aspirational or symbolic.
Fair trial ideologies - compromise and accommodation in international
tribunals?
One might assume that if the main western criminal procedural styles to some
extent co-exist to allow for international criminal trials and thereby facilitate
the process of internationalising criminal justice, the ideology underpinning
these styles eventually will become more essentially harmonious. Instead, in
practice, ideological dissonance between trial styles (at international proced-
ural levels) is either understated or simply not fully thought through. It is
masked by regular restatements of universal principle (such as the similar
and uniform ascription to a presumption of innocence in each style), and
commonality of key terms and language.
The degree of divergence is apparent in the debates regarding the appro-
priateness of trials in absentia, in the international criminal tribunals. 41 Yet
even these have been veiled in compromise. This may be a factor of the
political atmosphere in which the existence of international criminal justice
institutions have been negotiated, from jurisdictions wherein these western
styles predominate.
40 M. Bohlander & M. Findlav, "The Use of Domestic Sources as a Basis for International
Criminal Law Principles - An exchange of civilities in the search for a common denominator"
(forthcoming).
41 V Morris & M. Schar/ An Insiders Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, 1995, pp. 222 and following.
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Significant divergence between ideologies also suggests, as for both ori-
ginating procedural styles behind the present wave of internationalisation that
essential elements of their concepts of justice are unclear, incompatible or are
realised differentially. 42 The notion of fair trial is a case in point. In certain
jurisdictions it is guaranteed through justiciable rights while in others it is
little more than a tone to be set through wide ranging judicial discretion. Even
what constitutes 'fairness' is not consistent across jurisdictions and traditions,
beyond what might be imposed from regional and international conventions.
Along with difficulties regarding consistency in principles underpinning
fair trial, there appear to be problems with the manner in which these are
translated and developed. Fair trial determinants are reliant on institutional
authority to ensure their application. Such authority is very often judicial,
interpretative and recognised through precedent.
Precedent is the principle on which common law judicial reasoning is said
to rest. This doctrine is both the foundation for common law legal authority,
as well as the process through which judicial reasoning is said to be construc-
ted, and transferred. It is in common law, dependant on the notion of stare
decisis where the decisions of a superior court are directly binding on the
lower courts within a common jurisdiction. Precedent-based case law is not
essentially a feature of the civil law judicial authority. However, even where
codes declare the law and judges more strictly interpret their application, the
process of interpretation recognises past decisions to some degree.
It is proposed for the International Criminal Court (ICC), "the court may
apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions".
43
This would suggest at least an invitation to precedent-based case law author-
ity, rather than statutes alone as providing legal authority. Complicating this,
the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICC need to recognise those rules of
process within their own legislative basis, applicable treaties and principles
of international law, and "general principles of law derived ... from national
laws of legal systems of the world ... provided that these are not inconsistent
with (the court's statutes and international law)". 44 Add to this the require-
ment to interpret law consistent with internationally recognised and codified
human rights, and any hierarchy of precedent for the ICC will not operate
in any simple path of authority. If notions of fair trial differ at any or each
of these levels of potential authority then it will take more than pathways of
precedent to ensure resolution.
42 For example, the Italian 'presumption of innocence is literally a presumption that the
accused is not guilty as opposed to an affirmative statement of innocence. This is attributable
to the Italian view of the incompatibility of a presumption of innocence with pre-trial restraints
on personal liberty and prevails throughout the appeal process. See CPP Arts 60, 648.
43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Stat.) Art. 21 (2).
44 ICC Stat. Art. 21 (1).
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Were the doctrine of precedent to govern international judicial decision-
making in the criminal jurisdiction it would be essentially influenced by the
contesting notions of the law coming before the Trial Chambers, from their
origins in different traditions, with different ideological justifications and
concepts of justice prevailing.
Consistency then would not be imposed (in any common law sense)
through a single hierarchical application of precedent within a common con-
text of judicial reasoning. Precedent would, as seems to be the case in tribunal
practice, become the process of procedural compromise. Precedent as it is
more narrowly used in common law would not, for the ICC, be easily re-
conciled with the other provisions on "Applicable Law" (the title of Article
21).
Criminal trials in both procedural traditions declare the special position
of the accused, and his pre-eminence in determining access to justice as a
feature of fair trial. The presumption of innocence is said to provide the
context within which the accused should have claim to access, and is why
fairness should apply to the manner in which he is tried. 45 The Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY Stat.)
declares that the accused shall be innocent until proven guilty.46 As well, the
accused is accorded the right to remain silent47 and he/she is not compelled to
testify against himself or confess his guilt. 48 While these protections appear
to comply with international instruments such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 49 they are contradicted in the practice of both
procedural styles, and may be qualified or waived even in the workings of
the international tribunal. For instance, in England the right to silence has
recently been curtailed.50 In most civil law traditions, while the presumption
of innocence may be accepted, it is expected that the accused will be an
45 In conventional civil law traditions, where the presumption of innocence may not prevail,
fairness for the accused may be limited to his right to refute the charges, and access through
active legal representation may not carry the same connection with justice as it might in a
common law tradition.
46 ICTY Stat. Art. 21 (3).
47 ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure (RPE) Rule 42 (A) (iii). No reference in the
Statute or the Rules is made to any inferences which the judge or prosecutor may draw if
silence is claimed. See also the ICC Stat. Art. 67 (1)(g).
48 ICTY Stat. Art. 21 (3)(g).
49 Article 14(3)(g) sets out the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself or
confess guilt". This has no express equivalent in the European convention and as an implied
right enjoys less firm protection.
50 The right to the unsworn "dock statement" has been removed (which is contrary to
the proposed protection in the ICC - ICC Stat. Art. 67 (1)(h)). Judges are also given some
restricted opportunity to make adverse comment on an accused's refusal to answer questions
in certain circumstances. See for instance, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ss.
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initial witness in his/her defence and that their testimony will answer the
inquisition. With charges relating to crimes where the special knowledge of
the accused is recognised, in either tradition the presumption against self-
incrimination may be waived. 5' Even for the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), its Rules provide opportunity to require
answers which may be self incriminatory, with the provision that on objection
the witness will be protected from criminal prosecution supported by this
evidence (except for perjury). 52 If there is harmony here it is in the ascrip-
tion to a universal belief assuming quite different procedural manifestations,
which then is qualified in pre-trial and trial practice.
Under article 66 (2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court the
onus is placed on the prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond
reasonable doubt".53 While this is procedurally consistent with the presump-
tion of innocence it would require a significant shift in the inquisitorial role
of procurators in civil law traditions. 54 As a universal rule it also stands in
contrast with developments in common law jurisdictions to impose the onus
of denying guilt on an accused for specific offences, through devices such as
presumptions regarding knowledge and possession, or through strict liability
offence constructions.
55
Independence for trial professionals is a common aspiration within both
original procedural styles. The independent judge is the front line of defence
for fair trial and is the arbiter when issues of access are in question. The
construction of international tribunals is also said to rest on the independent
judiciary. 56 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) is constituted by a bench selected through a complex election process
designed to ensure the widest representation from UN states. 57 Its statute
specifically requires "adequate representation of the principal legal systems
of the world".58 Yet with the judiciary of the tribunal elected through a polit-
ically initiated ballot such as this, the independent presence and operational
34, 36. 37. For a wider discussion of these issues see, Murray v DPP (1992) 97 Cr. App. Rep.
151; R v Martinez-Tobon (1994) 2 All E.R. 90.
51 For a discussion of this in the context of Article 6 of the European Convention, see
Saunders v UK (1977) 23 E.H.R.R. 313.
52 ICTY (RPE) Rule 90 (E) (as amended).
53 This formula now is no longer strictly required in English jury directions.
54 This is taken even further from the civil law tradition when the ICC statute protects
against the imposition on the accused of "any reversal of the burden of proof, or any onus of
rebuttal"- ICC Stat. Art. 67 (1)(i).
55 See, for instance, the Magistrates Courts Act 1980, (Eng) s.101; Misuse of Drugs Act
1971, (Eng) s.27 (2); Public Order Act 1986, (Eng) s.6 (5).
56 ICTY Stat. Art. 12.
57 ICTY Stat. Art. 13.
58 Ibid.
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status of the international judiciary might be impugned. For instance, both
with the ICTY and the proposed International Criminal Court (ICC) issues
of delegated authority and the role of the UN Security Council in facilitating
prosecutions and enforcing judgments make the separation from international
political instrumentality somewhat illusory.59 Even if this goes no further than
whether justice is seen to be done, 60 the injection of state interests into the
selection process for the international judicial chambers does not sit well with
an ideology of independence.
Another important ideological premise grounding fairness for the criminal
trial is that of individual criminal responsibility. While the accused is said to
have acted voluntarily and has a proven capacity for committing the offence
may be individually liable, he must have access to the case against him and
the opportunity to individually address it in a fair trial setting. The Statute of
the ICTY 61 and the and the Statute of the ICC 62 each express the principle
of individual liability. Once said, both statutes proceed to allow for vicarious
liability, complicity, and to deny the excuse of superior orders or office. A
practical reason for the recognition of individual over collective or generic
liability here is to avoid prosecutions directed against the state or any official
capacity. 63 But notions of generic liability tend to further remove the accused
from the assurance of access to justice as an individual.
The Yugoslav tribunal in its decisions has demonstrated a difficulty in
coming to terms with the core adversarial features of its procedures in
particular the right of the parties to determine who is called to testify. This
has lead to changes in the rules of procedure as they operate in the tribunal to
permit the court a greater level of control over the process. This may be seen
as a direct consequence of the influence of civil law judges, inexperienced in,
and clearly unhappy with, the adversarial model.64
Continuing at a procedural level one of the major ideological challenges
for the international tribunals appears to be the production a common concep-
59 The role of the Security Council and the General Assembly in filling casual judicial
vacancies, appointing other trial professionals, disciplining professional misconduct, and en-
suring the primacy of the tribunal or court against those of national jurisdictions makes the
bond a more operational one. Similar criticisms could be raised in relation to the independence
of the prosecutor.
60 For research examining whether the decisions of the International Court of Justice are
influenced by the selection process used for that court, see F Brown Weiss, "Judicial In-
dependence and Impartiality", in L. Damrosch (ed.) The International Court of Justice at a
Crossroads, 1987.
61 Art. 7 (1).
62 Art. 25 (2).
63 For instance, ICTY Stat. Art. 7. Another indicator of this is the limitation on the
jurisdiction of these tribunals only over "natural persons".
64 For this theme I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer.
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tualisation of fair trial and to see its uniform acceptance in the form of rights
protections now commonplace at a regional level throughout Europe. This
may not always translate down to individual jurisdictions. Within common
law procedural styles, for example, where recognition of the rights of the
accused has either proceeded from broad statements of often-contradictory
principle, 65 or is constructed against challenges to justice on a case by case
basis, a coherent representation of the essential elements in fair trial is
illusive.
In reality, a constant policy concern across procedural traditions is access
to justice. This is the case where these traditions intersect in the international
tribunals, as it is where individual jurisdictions endeavour to translate and
inscribe the injunctions of regional and international conventions. Article 6 of
the European Convention declares a range of specific access rights as being
essential to a holistic notion of trial fairness. As is discussed later, the inter-
national tribunals follow a similar course 66 but their jurisdiction and purpose
suggest particular problems for the achievement of access as an indicator of
fair trial.
Essential connections between procedure and access to justice
Lord Woolf observed the following features as ensuring access in the context
of civil justice:
" The process should be just in the results it delivers;
" It should be fair and seen to be so by:
- Ensuring that litigants have an equal opportunity, regardless of their
resources, to assert or defend their legal rights;
- Providing every litigant with an adequate opportunity to state his own
case and answer his opponents;
- Treating like cases alike.
" Procedures and costs should be proportional to the nature of the issues
involved;
" It should deal with cases with reasonable speed;
" It should be understandable to those who use it;
" It should be responsive to the needs of those who use it;
" It should provide as much certainty as the nature of the particular cases
allows;
65 See A. Norrie, Crime, History and Reason, 2001.
66 For instance, under its Statute (Article 67) the International Criminal Court will recognise
the same rights as those set out in Article 6 of the Convention along with a specific reference
to the right to silence and the protection against self incrimination.
INTERNATIONALISED CRIMINAL TRIAL AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
* It should be effective: adequately resourced and organised so as to give
effect to the previous principles.
67
Perhaps as a consequence of the civil justice context, the flavor of these
principles is processual, and recognises important relationships and interests
contesting for justice. Even so, the broad themes provide a useful framework
for evaluating access to criminal justice in a variety of procedural contexts.
Access to justice is a universal aspiration for fair trial and as such should not
be dependent on the nature and procedural tradition of any particular process
or jurisdiction. Unfortunately, procedural peculiarities, and institutional pri-
orities, compounded by the liberal application of prosecutorial and judicial
discretion tend to maintain the jurisdictional relativity of fair trial and access
features in practice.
Connecting access to criminal justice with fair trial requirements 68 has
until recently in most jurisdictions resulted in statements of principles almost
entirely centred on the accused person. Perhaps this might more recently be
explained by the predominance of adversarial trial models where the con-
test is between the state and the accused on behalf of the victim and the
community. This has developed an attitude to access amongst the judiciary
and legislators of both original procedural traditions that is largely defence-
focused, rather than formally recognising competing claims to justice from
victims and the community.69 Further, it has produced a debate both about
procedural reform and access which tends to diminish the essential connec-
tion between the two by arguing for or against the rights protections, seeking
a better balance between adversarial parties, and as a result concentrating
against the abuse of power.
Access to justice requires smooth procedures to ensure fair trial outcomes.
Strong structures of rights and protections for lay participants in criminal
trials are not sufficient on their own.
Particularly with serious criminal offences, access to fair trial is a key
indicator of fairness in any system of criminal justice. It is in the upper tier
of trial justice that the courts are more particular about the manner in which
procedure ensures access. However, the trial at all its levels is notoriously
constructed to exclude the active involvement of all but legal professionals. 70
This is more so now in common law courts as the rights of the accused are
67 Woolf op cit, chap. 1.
68 Such as is done in Article 6 of the European Convention, and ICC Stat. Art. 67.
69 This is not so much the case in civil law jurisdictions where the victim, for instance, may
have a right to question witnesses and present evidence.
70 See R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law, an introduction, 1992.
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continually qualified, 7 1 and lay participation is limited or as with the case of
recent jury reforms, gradually falls away.
Despite the growth in international human rights jurisprudence, in both
civil law and common law trial procedures, less regard seems to be paid to
the equation of trial fairness with access issues. This is despite the growing
influence of rights discourse over trial practice and outcomes. 72 The same
cannot be said for civil justice.73 If the trial were declining as an important
centre for the achievement of justice then this may not be a cause for concern.
In some local jurisdictions with increased pressure on the accused to plead,
this is so. However, as the central symbol of international criminal justice, the
trial remains the context against which most other access issues are directed,
irrespective of the ratio of trials to pleas in a more general trial context.
Managerialist criminal justice policy agendas are reducing access to the
trial (or preferred forms of trial) through:
1. the overvaluation of plea (and sentence discounting)
2. the recognition and institutionalising of the bargain at charge and plea
stage, and
3. the variation of modes of trial.
74
This means that for whatever reasons access to the trial (and the justice pro-
tections which judicial oversight affords) are less viable and available. This
trend is well researched both in terms of the miscarriages of justice which it
may foster, and the efficiencies in case management it allows. There is little
work, however, on the impact this has over actual opportunities for access and
lay participation in the trial.
Against the trend in many individual civil law and common law jurisdic-
tions the trial is an essential motivator for the internationalisation of criminal
procedure. However, as is discussed later, issues of access and lay parti-
cipation remain problematic in these developments. This is not due to any
necessary dislocation between trial procedures and access to justice. Rather,
it indicates an inability to translate expectations for access and fair trial into
consistent procedural frameworks within the context of international criminal
justice.
71 Current legislative and administrative intervention into trial practice in several common
law jurisdictions promotes the "level playing field" notion of rights and obligations, and
advances victims rights against protections for the accused.
72 As discussed in A. Ashworth, Article 6 and the Fairness of Trials, Crim. L.R., 1999, pp.
261-272.
73 See Woolfop cit.
74 In England, for instance, see Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill 1999.
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Access to justice and international trials
It merits speculation that if international criminal justice has some reson-
ance for regional and local criminal procedure then the influence on criminal
justice policy generated by the essential position of the trial within new
international procedural conditions should have an impact on the concep-
tualisation of access to justice. The supportive contexts of Article 6 of the
European Convention, and for Britain the Human Rights Act would place any
such influence within the context of fair trial discourse. The international trial
process is the arena in which access at that level is discussed, and international
criminal justice tends to equate access with avenues for trial participation,
first for the accused and then for victims. It will be difficult for regional and
local jurisdictional concerns about access to move well beyond the trial, as
international criminal justice focuses more and more on this context.
At the international level of criminal justice, the trial is rejuvenated. For
often clearly political reasons the theatre of the public trial is a signific-
ant driving force behind the development of international criminal justice
policy.75 Even so, it would appear from the foundation instruments of the
tribunals, the relationship between the paramount position of the trial in in-
ternational criminal procedure, and requirements for fair trial, have not been
entirely worked through. At least not insofar as they allow for and protect
access to justice. The consideration of access to justice as exemplified through
trial participation has not much ventured outside the "rights foundations" of
international criminal procedure. This in turn is primarily conceived as apply-
ing to the accused. For instance, little is said at the international level, about
the access by trial context, beyond peripheral concerns such as protection
for victim witnesses76 and victim compensation. 77 This appears as contrary
to current concerns for victim impact, and victim compensation in various
common law and civil law jurisdictions where the victim is given direct access
to the sentencing process.
In the area of judicial oversight as a guarantee of access to justice, in-
ternational tribunal practice is also rather general and formative. In the case
of the ICTY, for example, the tribunal is responsible for the protection of
7' N.B. ICC Stat. Art. 64; ICTY Stat. Art. 20 (for a discussion of in camera conditions see,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, Rules 74, 87).
76 It is envisaged that in the ICC there will be a Victims and Witnesses unit charged with
their protection. See, Article 68 (2), (3) & (4); Article 43 (6). Despite being established in the
court registrar the unit will operate in consultation with the prosecutor to ensure security and
protection rather than access. Also, see J Cockayne, Procedural and Processual Synthesis in
International Tribunals: Part III; Victims and witnesses, (unpublished paper), 2001.
77 See ICC Star. Arts. 75 & 79 and the establishment of a trust fund for the benefit of victims.
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witnesses and victims. 78 Judgments when delivered must be accompanied by
written reasons. 79 Where errors of law or fact occasioning a miscarriage of
justice are alleged appeal is available, and a review of judgment can follow
the discovery of new relevant facts.
80
The existence of a Pre-trial Chamber8 l is supposed to protect the accused
and his expectations for justice during the investigation stage. The chamber
may "take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficacy and
integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, to protect the rights of the
defence".
8 2
Disclosure of evidence to the accused prior to trial is crucial for the for-
mulation of claims for access. The obligations for disclosure of evidence may
have a bearing on access to justice and are an interesting procedural feature of
the international tribunals. In the ICTY the prosecutor shall make available to
the accused as soon as practicable after his initial appearance "copies of the
supportive material which accompanied the indictment when confirmation
was sought as well as all prior statements obtained by the prosecutor from
the accused or from prosecution witnesses".8 3 This would seem to encom-
pass statements, which were not to be used by the prosecution in their case
(provided these had been recorded as statements), and if so it would go well
beyond general common law conventions for the disclosure of the prosec-
ution "brief". Regarding the ICTY, the requirement for the prosecution to
disclose extends to the inspection of all documentation and material evidence
on which the prosecution will rely or which is material to the preparation
of the defence. The prosecutor may resist disclosure if in his/her opinion it
would be against the public interest to do so, or it would prejudice an on-
going investigation or the security interests of any State. This is determined
on application to the Trial Chamber. 84
It is in the area of reciprocal disclosure where procedures might be viewed
as having gone beyond the conventional expectations in common law jurisdic-
tions.8 5 The prosecutor is required to notify the defence of the witnesses that
78 ICTY Stat. Art. 22.
79 ICTY Stat. Art. 23.
80 ICTY Stat. Arts. 25 & 26.
81 For instance, in the ICC Stat. Arts 56-69.
82 ICC Stat. Art. 56 (l)b).
83 ICTY (RPE) Rule 66 (A).
84 ICTY (RPE) Rule 66 (C).
85 While it is not a convention in common law to require the defence to disclose there have
been recent statutory developments creating these limited obligations. See Criminal Procedure
and Investigation Act (Eng) 1996. Also note the requirement in jurisdictions such as Scotland
for the notification of special defences. Even so these are the exception rather than the rule
and in no way equate with the prosecutions' responsibilities in this regard.
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will be called to establish their case and to rebut any defences. The defence
on the other hand shall notify the prosecution of an alibi and "any special
defence (such as diminished responsibility) and the notification shall specify
the names and addresses of witnesses upon which the accused intends to rely
to establish the special defence". 86 Except in particular circumstances this
level and detail of disclosure challenges the common law protections of the
accused referred to earlier, ideologically at least at the heart of the presump-
tion of innocence. 87 Even more unusual in this context is the rule that if the
defence applies for access to the material evidence on which the prosecution
intends to rely then the prosecutor "shall be entitled to" any and all similar
evidence in the defence case. 88 Also there is an ongoing duty on both parties
to disclose any evidence which later comes to their attention which should
have been disclosed under the rules.
89
There is an overriding duty on the prosecutor to disclose any exculpatory
evidence; such that suggests the innocence of the accused "or mitigate the
guilt of the accused or may effect the credibility' of the prosecution evidence"
(emphasis added). 90 Such an obligation based on the subjective assessment
of a party to the proceedings no doubt will generate pre-trial argument. In
addition, it is entirely reliant on the integrity of the prosecutor and points to
the difficulty of the enforceability of such rules of disclosure.
The issue of disclosure required by the ICTY is further complicated
through a detailed set of exclusions. 91 These include internal memoranda
about the investigation, and certain information delivered in confidence.
92
Witnesses may be compelled to answer even self-incriminating questions but
if so they have immunity from further prosecution on this evidence. 93
86 ICTY (RPE) Rule 67 (A)(ii) indicates that the consequence of a failure to disclose limits
the right of the accused to utilise the special defence insofar as he cannot call evidence in
support beyond his personal testimony.
87 In this respect it is not only the ideology of original procedural styles which is challenged,
but so too consistency with the ideology of the international tribunals.
88 ICTY (RPE) Rule 67 (C).
89 This, of course highlights a common failing with expectations for disclosure: the party
on whom the obligation is placed is also the party likely to have special knowledge of what
should be disclosed. Therefore, the enforcement of disclosure obligations as of right from the
benefiting party may prove impossible.
90 ICTY (RPE) Rule 68.
91 ICTY (RPE) Rule 70 - Matters not Subject to Disclosure.
92 If such information is required for disclosure, the person providing confidential inform-
ation cannot be compelled as a witness to answer questions which he declines on the basis of
confidentiality - ICTY (RPE) Rule 70 (D).
9' ICTY (RPE) Rule 90 (E). Interestingly, this stands in opposition to rights charters such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See how this stands against the
protections espoused in ICTY (RPE) Rule 95.
MARK FINDLAY
Another unique interest claiming and receiving access in the international
context is that of contracting (or referring) states. In this respect access to
justice may be viewed as a question of jurisdiction or standing and may relate
to effective prosecution rather than defence. Particularly in the case of the
ICC, the context of its creation will require that a state with a direct interest
in the proceedings will have access. States may refer crimes to the prosecutor
for investigation and trial. 94 The prosecutor, through the Pre-trial Chamber
may claim jurisdiction over a reluctant or unable state, to investigate and
prosecute crimes within the mandate of the court. The independence of the
tribunal restricts the potential for access by contracting states to the process
or outcomes of the trial, beyond the initiating stage.
In its broadest sense, the accused alone is offered the right to appear in
person before independent tribunals, as the international courts claim to be
constituted. The hearing, it is claimed, will be fair and impartial and operate
under a process with the characteristics of fairness comparable with those
generally espoused in Article 6 of the European Convention. However, the
independence and impartiality of any international tribunal, and the fairness
it can guarantee are obviously dependent on the nature of its constitution and
the history of its recent operation.
Challenges to access the actuality of legal representation
Access to trial justice is best explained by viewing both lay and professional
involvement within the trial. From either perspective it needs to be analysed
on at least three levels:
access to trial (and those mechanisms which divert participants from the
trial; accused, witnesses and victims),
access by those within the trial (the accused through actual repres-
entation; child witnesses in particular through specialised procedural
provisions, victims through recognition and compensation),
access to the community by the trial (usually identified by involvement
in verdict delivery).
At each level it is not difficult to identify impediments and opportunities for
access.
A useful way to critically expose the reality of access in trials in any
context is to identify points of connection between the professional and lay
participants in the trial, at crucial situations of access. This becomes even
more important as recent research identifies that it is the relationship between
lay and professional participants in the trial, rather than the form of trial or the
94 ICC Stat. Art. 14.
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situations in which parties relate which is crucial to trial outcomes. 95 Legal
representation and the interaction between the advocate and the accused are
examples of this crucial relationship.
At the international level the issue may be communication rather than
availability of representation. In a variety of trials before the ICTY, appointed
defence counsel have come from language, cultural and legal traditions very
different from the experience of the accused. This has led to difficulties with
instruction, communication and representation, let alone the most effective
preparation and presentation of a defence. In some cases this has produced a
defection of counsel or requests for a new legal team.
96
While the right access by the accused to legal representation was stated
and complied with at the international level, in these cases, real access for
the accused may have been denied through communication failure. The lan-
guages of the court, and the limitations over choice of counsel for the defence
have clearly alienated some defendants. The reality of effective lawyer/client
communication will become more keenly appreciated in the international
context (and will be eventually recognised as an essential qualifier of fair trial
through the right of representation). This then may inform comparable access
debates in the European courts, and filter down to local jurisdictions which
tend to focus on service availability rather than the nature of representation
and delivery. If such were to be the case then the relationship between rep-
resentation, its actuality and fair trial would transform debates about legal aid
and access to justice into considerations of quality and actuality and not just
availability. For this to happen would mean that the equality of arms condition
of fair trial would take on a more quantifiable meaning.
The nature, quality and availability of legal representation are crucial to
the fair trial from the perspective of the accused. But representation, or the
lack of it may not merely be evaluated in terms of legal aid mechanisms,
or principles of equality of alms.9 7 Before the international tribunals, legal
representation may be guaranteed but the divisions of language, culture and
experience between the accused and his counsel may qualify the actual-
ity of representation and hence access. In this regard, the crucial nature of
the lay/professional relationship, so significant in trial outcomes is at the
heart of "access" to justice, and not just the provision of any professional
representation.
95 For a detailed exploration of this in the context of comparative trial research, see M. Find-
/ay & R. Henham, "Methodology and the Comparative Contextual Analysis of Trial Process:
A preliminary study" at <www.clr.ntu.ac.uk/ictp/index.htm>, 2002.
96 See the case of Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1 -AR72).
97 This is a principle essential for the European courts' interpretation of Article 6 rights. In
brief, it refers to a person being afforded reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to a
court under conditions which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage to his opponent.
MARK FINDLAY
The context of international criminal justice, and more particularly the
dynamics of the international tribunals, where professional representation
alone may not ensure access to justice, throws into stark relief the nature
of the lay/professional relationship and its essence in fair trial. Access to
justice guarantees before the international tribunals centre around profes-
sional representation for the accused but are silent on the issues of quality
and compatibility, and say nothing about the manner in which equality of
arms is actually ensured.
The location of tribunal investigations and hearings may exacerbate the
cultural divide between the accused and his legal representative, and therefore
endanger equality of arms. In addition, the nature of the charges indicted from
international jurisdictions, the limited available defences, and the acceptance
of factual generality in establishing either98 could create conditions where
access to the real "defence" of a fair trial may be reduced.
Evaluating trial access
Access to justice is more than a matter of procedures and structures.9 9 Fun-
damentally access is a question of trial practice, and procedure may only
signpost what is expected for a trial to be considered fair. In practice ac-
cess relies on prosecutorial discretion, mode of trial, remand issues, and
sentencing process. But to understand the actual access offered these need
to be subdivided for analysis in both local and international trial settings. For
instance, within considerations of the prosecution, sufficiency of evidence,
public interest and accountability, disclosure protocols, delay, principles of
diversion, governance of evidence delivery etc. require consideration as they
impact on the identified perspectives of access. Perhaps more significantly,
there needs to be a deconstruction of the relationship between the accused
and his legal representatives so as to test the reality of such representation in
the context of access to justice, and to weigh equality of arms.
Linked to the evaluation of institutional features of the trial access should
follow a critical review of the principal sites of decision-making which in-
fluence the trial and construct its progress. These may most simply focus on
important justice professionals such as the prosecutor, the defence advocate
and the judicial officer who are crucial in facilitating and overseeing access.
Regarding the sentencer, for instance, it is necessary to examine the influence
98 Note the Tribunal's difficulty in the Tadit case (supra, at note 96) in accepting or im-
pugning the alibi defences when the indictment ranged over broad and uncertain temporal and
spatial qualifiers.
99 See B. Zupanid, Access to Courts as a Human Right According to the European
Convention on Human Rights, 9/2 Nottingham Law Journal, 2000, pp. 1-16.
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of the prosecutor, decisions to divert, victim impact, complaint adjudication,
minimum standards, plea discounting, the provision of reasons, race and
gender issues, and the operation of judicial discretion in general.
Once decision-making is identified as crucial for access, then the re-
lationships producing these decisions, as well as the relationships which
the decisions cement, should be open for evaluation in access terms. The
lay/professional relationship, and more specifically that of the accused and his
legal representative, must be evaluated in terms of quality and compatibility
for equality of arms to have any meaning.
